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Abstract: Though the impact of cost-sharing on health care demand is well documented in 
developed countries, evidence from developing countries is rare. This paper’s contribution is 
to analyse the impact of increasing coinsurance in a developing nation -Vietnam – by 
exploiting a quasi-natural experiment in that country. In 2007, the Vietnam government 
reintroduced a 20 percent coinsurance for individuals who hold voluntary health insurance 
policies. As individuals with compulsory health insurance were exempt from this re-
imposition of coinsurance, this policy change may be regarded as a quasi-natural experiment. 
To exploit this change, we use a difference-in-difference approach to examine whether the 
increase in coinsurance effectively reduced the demand for health care services among those 
affected. We find it has no statistically significant effect on the quantity of health care 
demanded. We however find that those who were under 18 or in low income households 
reduced their health care use after the increase in coinsurance. These findings hold – at least 
in the short-run, with a variety of different outcomes and estimators. 
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1. Introduction 
Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments continue to be the major source of health financing in most 
low and middle income countries (O'Donnell et al., 2008). Unsurprisingly, there are 
widespread interests in expanding health insurance in these countries to provide their citizens 
with financial protection against health risks. One challenge is that the main advantage of 
health insurance for a family is the financial protection the insurance provides, which may 
trade off against public policy goals of increasing access, since greater access means higher 
premiums relative to the value of health benefits. In theory, cost-sharing1 can be used to deal 
with this challenge since it is considered both as a means of reducing health care over-use and 
as an important source of health care financing (Zweifel and Manning, 2000). In practice, it is 
important to understand whether and to what extent cost-sharing achieves this end.   
There is a large literature on the impact of cost-sharing on demand for health services in the 
developed world.2 The dominant view in the literature on health economics is that cost-
sharing does reduce moral hazard, as intended (Remler and Greene, 2009). The most lauded 
study on this topic, the 1974-1982 RAND Health Insurance Experiment in the US (Manning 
et al., 1987; Newhouse, 1993), randomised subjects between insurance plans, and 
demonstrated that the use of medical services does indeed decrease with consumer 
coinsurance provisions, with stronger effects on the quantity of outpatient care demanded 
than the quantity of inpatient care demanded. Other US studies also find that co-payments for 
ambulatory services or physical visits reduce health care utilization (Cherkin et al., 1989; 
Zweifel and Manning, 2000; Chandra et al., 2010a, 2014).  
Studies conducted outside the US have, however, produced mixed results. For instance, in 
Europe, the evidence that co-payments affect health service consumption is ambiguous. 
Several studies for Germany (Winkelmann, 2004a, b), Belgium (Voorde et al., 2001) and 
Chile (Duarte, 2012), for instance, find that co-payments reduce health care utilization, while 
other studies for France (Chiappori et al., 1998), Belgium (Cockx and Brasseur, 2003), 
Germany (Schreyögg and Grabka, 2010) and the Netherlands (van Dijk et al., 2013) find that 
co-payments have little or no effect on physician visits in general and specialist visits in 
particular.  
1 There are three basic types of cost-sharing: co-payments (payment of a fixed amount for each medical service), 
coinsurance (payment of a fixed percentage of the health care expenditure), and deductibles (payment of the first 
$ x of care each year). 
2 See Remler and Greene (2009), for example, for a recent literature review on the impact of cost-sharing. 
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In the developing world a lack of some basic health care facilities (James et al., 2006) and 
higher levels of OOP expenditure (Musgrove et al., 2002; O'Donnell et al., 2008) are 
common, so evidence on the impact of cost-sharing from developed countries is not readily 
applicable to developing countries. However, there is a paucity of empirical evidence from 
the developing world and thus there is a need for more research in this area (Karlan and 
Morduch, 2010; O'donnell and Jones, 2016).  
One possible explanation for the limited evidence on the effects of health insurance cost-
sharing on health care demand in developing countries is that health insurance markets are, 
themselves, generally underdeveloped. Furthermore, even when data on cost-sharing, 
coverage and utilization are available, researchers using data from developed and developing 
countries alike find it difficult to isolate the causal effect of cost-sharing on utilization due to 
the potential and concomitant adverse selection problem. Adverse selection refers to the case 
where the insured choose more generous plans because they expect their health expenditure 
to be higher (Arrow, 1963; Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). In an attempt to 
establish causality some researchers have used random experiments (like the RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment) and natural experiments (Cockx and Brasseur, 2003; Winkelmann, 
2004a; Zhang, 2007; Chandra et al., 2010a; Schreyögg and Grabka, 2010; Siminski, 2011).   
As far as we are aware, Zhang’s (2007) study is the only one that explicitly examines the 
impact of cost-sharing on health care demand in a developing country.3 Zhang  (2007) took 
advantage of differential changes in co-payments for private sector employees and 
government employees to isolate the causal effects of changes in co-payments for inpatient 
treatment. Because the changes to co-payments were determined exogenously, the author was 
able to abstract from the typical selection problems of most observational studies. Using a 
difference-in-difference (DID) method and data from a single hospital in a city in China, 
Zhang (2007) found that a reduction in co-payments increased inpatient treatment claims. 
The generalisability of that paper’s findings to the developing world is limited for several 
reasons. First, Zhang  (2007) was able only to observe inpatient treatment claims at a single 
hospital (an A + class hospital). It is likely that due to cross-price effects, the insured patients 
who were affected by the reduction in co-payments at this hospital might have altered their 
consumption of complementary (e.g., outpatient) and/or substitute health care services (e.g., 
3 Duarte (2012) provides evidence on price elasticity of health expenditure for a middle income country (Chile). 
A related field of study is the impact of user fees on health care demand in developing countries. For a review, 
see, for example, James et al. (2006) and Lagarde and Palmer (2008).  
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inpatient services provided by other hospitals with different co-payment provisions). Second, 
since the result depends on a single city in China, its findings are not reasonably generalisable 
to other parts of the developing world where the majority of people live in rural areas. In this 
paper, we contribute to the literature by analyzing the impact of an increase in coinsurance 
(unlike the impact of a reduction in co-payments examined by Zhang (2007)) on the number 
of outpatient and inpatient treatments using a quasi-natural experiment and a nationally 
representative data set from Vietnam. Coinsurance and co-payments are different and they 
may produce different effects. In addition, our richer dataset is amenable to an analysis that 
may shed light on the effects of cost-sharing on health care utilization at the national level for 
a developing country.  
Vietnam also offers an interesting case study of the impact of cost-sharing on health care 
utilisation for several other reasons. It is currently undertaking health financing reforms in an 
attempt to achieve universal health insurance (Wagstaff et al., 2016). Over the last decade, 
significant changes in health insurance policies have been implemented and have resulted in a 
rapid growth in coverage and health care utilisation: in the period 2004 to 2006, the number 
of Vietnamese people with private health insurance doubled (World Bank, 2007). This rapid 
increase coincided with a deficit4 for the first time in the health insurance fund in late 2006, 
suggesting that asymmetric information problems may exist in the health insurance system. 
To encourage the financial sustainability of the health insurance fund, the government of 
Vietnam adopted a variety of supply-side strategies such as the introduction of prospective 
reimbursement for hospitals and the creation of a list of reimbursed drugs. On the demand 
side, policies that increased health insurance premiums and coinsurance rates were also 
instituted (Lieberman and Wagstaff, 2009). In particular, the coinsurance rate for the insured 
under voluntary schemes increased from zero to 20 percent as of April 2007. The reform can 
be considered as a quasi-natural experiment because it affected only those insured who were 
enrolled in voluntary health insurance policies and did not affect those who are either insured 
under compulsory schemes or not insured at all. 
This paper uses panel data from two Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSSs) 
that were undertaken in 2006 and 2008 and a DID method to examine the impact of the 
increase in coinsurance on health care demand. We find that the increase in coinsurance 
caused no significant reduction in the quantity of health care demanded. We however find 
4 The health insurance fund switched from a surplus of 1,989 billion VND in June 2006, which was accumulated 
over the previous ten years, to a deficit of 1,200 billion VND at the end of 2006. The health insurance fund also 
experienced a deficit of 1,839 billion VND (in 2007), 651 (2008) and 2,446 (2009). 
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that those who are under 18 or in low income households reduced their health care use after 
the increase in coinsurance. These findings are robust across different sets of outcomes and 
estimators.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Vietnam’s health 
insurance system as well as the change in cost-sharing policies in 2007. Section 3 describes 
the data and sample. The empirical model and econometric methodology used to investigate 
the impact of the increase in coinsurance are introduced in Section 4. Empirical results are 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents robustness checks for our empirical results. Finally, 
Section 7 summarises and discusses the findings.  
2. Health insurance policy in Vietnam 
2.1. Overview of Vietnam’s health insurance 
Table 1 summarises the structure of Vietnam’s health insurance system, which can be 
classified into two main schemes: compulsory health insurance (CHI) and voluntary health 
insurance (VHI). The compulsory scheme includes two sub-schemes: a mandatory earnings-
related, contribution-based social health insurance (SHI) scheme and a non-contributory 
scheme. The SHI scheme mainly covers public servants, employees in state-owned 
enterprises and those in the private formal sector. The non-contributory scheme was initially 
aimed at pensioners, war veterans, mothers, widows or orphans of veterans. A health care for 
the poor (HCFP) program was added to this group in 2003. This HCFP program was 
established to provide free access to individuals in households classified as poor; households 
in especially disadvantaged communes; and ethnic minorities living in six northeast 
mountainous areas and five highland provinces (Wagstaff, 2010). From 2005, the non-
contributory scheme was extended to include children under six.  
The voluntary component of the health insurance system was introduced in 1994 to cover 
students, the dependents of those covered by CHI, the self-employed and farmers. In 2006, 
enrolment in VHI was largely group based. Individuals who belonged to households with all 
members participating in some form of health insurance or living in a commune with at least 
10 percent of households participating in VHI could join the scheme. Similarly, students 
could join the VHI scheme as long as the institute where they were studying had at least 10 
percent of students participating. These group enrolment requirements were dropped in early 
2008. 
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The contribution rules for these schemes are also summarised in Table 1. The contribution 
rate for workers is set at 3 percent of salary, of which the employer contributes 2 percent and 
the employee 1 percent.5 The non-contributory scheme is calculated at 3 percent of the 
minimum wage and is paid out of the state budget. The premium rates for VHI are set 
according to the ability-to-pay, which is measured by rural/urban and student status, and 
range between VND 100,000 (US$ 6.25) per year for students in rural areas and VND 320 
(US$ 20) per year for household members in urban areas.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The benefit package covers most outpatient and inpatient treatment delivered by public health 
care providers or private health care providers who have signed a contract with Vietnam 
Social Security (VSS). The package covers the costs of consultations, diagnoses, treatment 
and rehabilitation during the time of treatment at the care facility, laboratory tests, diagnostic 
imaging; medicines promulgated on the Ministry of Health’s list; blood and transfusions; 
medical procedures and surgery; use of materials, medical equipment and treatment beds.  
2.2. Cost-sharing regulations and the  policy experiment in 2007 
Cost-sharing regulations have changed from time to time. From 2003 to September 2005, 20 
percent of treatment costs were shared by the insured. The benefits for the insured were more 
generous from September 2005 to April 2007 as all expenditures under VND 7 million (US$ 
438) per treatment were covered by the insurer. For treatment expenditures above VND 7 
million, a 40 percent coinsurance provision applied to the excess of expenditures (or rear-end 
deductible). The 20 percent coinsurance requirement was then reintroduced in 2007 but 
applied only to policy-holders insured under the voluntary scheme (see Table 1).6 As this 
policy change did not affect policy-holders who were insured under the compulsory schemes, 
this group may be used as a control group for our analysis and invites the use of the DID 
method to assess the effect of the April 2007 changes in the coinsurance provisions under the 
voluntary scheme.  
5 The 2008 Health Insurance Law, which was passed by the Vietnam National Assembly in November 2008 to 
take effect on 1 July 2009, increased the contribution rate to 6 percent of salary, in which employers pay 4 
percent and employees 2 percent. The contribution rate for the non-contributory scheme was also adjusted 
similarly. 
6 This policy change is stated in an inter-ministry circular number 06/2007/TTLT-BYT-BTC dated 30 March 
2007. The insured under the compulsory schemes were “forgotten” in this policy change until October 2009. 
Since 1/10/2009, they have had to pay from 5 to 20 percent of total treatment costs. 
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2.3. Studies on the impact of health insurance in Vietnam  
There has been no study of the impact of cost-sharing on health care quantities demanded in 
Vietnam, per se, but some work has shown that Vietnamese who have insurance have 
benefited. For instance, Sepehri et al. (2006b) find a positive influence of health insurance on 
hospital admission and length of stay. In terms of financial protection, voluntary health 
insurance is found to reduce the average OOP expenditure by between 20 percent (Sepehri et 
al., 2006a) and 200 percent (Jowett et al., 2003). More recently, Nguyen (2012) finds that 
having voluntary health insurance increases the insured’s number of outpatient and inpatient 
treatments. His study however does not find any significant impact of having VHI on OOP 
expenditure. In addition, Axelson et al. (2009) finds that HCFP increases health care 
utilisation, reduces household OOP expenditure and reduces the risk of catastrophic health 
expenditure. However, using the same data set but a different method, Wagstaff (2010) finds 
no statistically significant impact of having HCFP on the use of health services. The impact 
of health insurance on the behaviour of the insured in choosing care providers has also been 
studied. For example, insured patients have been found to be more likely to use outpatient 
facilities and public providers than the uninsured (Jowett et al., 2004). Furthermore, health 
insurance has been reported to decrease self-treatment among the insured (Chang and 
Trivedi, 2003). Health insurance is also found to have a positive impact on the nutritional 
status of the insured (Wagstaff, 2007). 
3. Data and sample  
3.1. Data 
For our analysis, we use two waves of the panel VHLSSs that were undertaken in 2006 and 
2008. The VHLSS is a nationally representative panel covering 9,189 and 9,186 households, 
respectively. Both surveys contain information on demographics, education, health, 
employment (at an individual level), income, assets, expenditure (on a household level) and a 
range of community-level infrastructural and institutional variables (for rural communes 
only). These two VHLSSs provide detailed information on the insurance schemes under 
which individuals are covered and their health care utilisation, thus making them amenable to 
the analyses we propose to use. 
Moreover, the timing of the two surveys suits the purpose of this study well. In both surveys, 
the interviews took place between May and September each year. Therefore, the quantity of 
health care utilisation in 2006, which has been reported for a period of 12 months prior to the 
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survey time, refers to health care utilization exclusively before the increase in coinsurance in 
April 2007. Similarly, the reported number of treatments in 2008 refers exclusively to 
treatments after the increase in coinsurance in April 2007. 
3.2. Sample 
The sample comprises individuals who were aged seven years or older in 2006. Children 
aged under seven are excluded from the sample because they are exempted from hospital fees 
even if they are uninsured (World Bank, 2007). Control and treated groups are defined using 
the individual’s health insurance status which is identified at the time of survey. However, 
health care use was measured for a period of 12 months prior to the survey time. If 
individuals changed their health insurance status (e.g., switched from VHI to CHI or became 
uninsured) within 12 months prior to the survey time of the VHLSS 2008, we cannot 
precisely identify to which group they belonged since they were not affected by the increase 
in coinsurance for the whole 12 months. To address the difference in measurement time of 
health insurance status and the use of health care services, we use panel data since it provides 
the history of health insurance enrolment for each individual between 2006 and 2008. The 
VHLSSs are particularly useful as they follow a panel of 15,777 individuals in 4,091 
households. The use of a panel sample also allows us to apply panel data econometric 
methods that are more robust (e.g. to unobserved heterogeneity) than cross-sectional data 
methods.  
3.3. Treatment and control groups 
While the uninsured were not affected by the increase in coinsurance, they are not used as a 
control group in this study for several reasons. First, there are other changes in health 
insurance policies during the study period (see Section 1) which may have different impact 
on the insured and uninsured. For example, there was an increase in premiums charged at the 
same time that coinsurance changed, which could impact health care demand. Moreover, the 
use of health care of the uninsured does not depend on waiting time requirements or an 
understanding of the health insurance system as that of the insured (either under CHI or 
VHI).7 As a result, we only use the insured under CHI as a control group. 
7 We experimented with using the uninsured as an alternative control group. Estimates show that compared with 
the uninsured, the VHI group in some cases appears to increase its health care demands following the 
introduction of the coinsurance provision. For this unexpected positive impact, it is possible that in a health care 
system characterised by complicated procedures it may take time for the insured to become eligible for more 
expensive (most likely inpatient) treatments as well as becoming conversant with the health insurance benefits; 
the impact of time is more important than that of price (Nguyen, 2008). 
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The DID method applied to panel data requires no change in the distribution of the control 
and treatments groups due to the increased coinsurance provision. We therefore focus on a 
panel of individuals who were continuously insured in their schemes during the same period.8 
In using a sample of individuals who did not change their health insurance status between 
2006 and 2008, however, we may face a sample selection problem if movements between 
these schemes were driven by the changed coinsurance provisions themselves. Although most 
individuals did not change their health insurance status during the study period we address 
the possible issues associated with this selection problem in Section 6. With the foregoing 
sample restriction, we have a sample of 1,801 individuals continuously insured under VHI 
(the treated group) and 3,686 individuals continuously insured under CHI (the control group). 
3.4. Measures of outcomes  
The 20 percent increase in coinsurance applied to both outpatient and inpatient treatment for 
the VHI group. We therefore directly assess the impact of the increase in coinsurance by 
analyzing the price responsiveness to the number of treatments.9 In addition, since the quasi-
experiment sets slightly different measures on outpatient and inpatient treatment, we 
accordingly assess the policy impact separately for these two types of treatment. These two 
measures are commonly used in studies on the impact of health insurance in Vietnam using 
the same data sets (Sepehri et al., 2006a; Wagstaff, 2010; Nguyen, 2012). In addition to these 
two outcomes, we use the number of times the insured use their health insurance card to pay 
for treatment as an additional outcome. We do this because there is evidence that insured 
patients in Vietnam do not always use their health insurance cards to claim for treatment even 
when they are eligible for health insurance benefits (Nguyen, 2008; Sepehri et al., 2009). 
Compared with the total number of treatments, the number of times the insured patients use 
health insurance cards better captures the impact of the increase in coinsurances on the 
behaviour of the insured. 
4. Empirical model 
4.1. Estimation model and econometric method  
We set up the empirical model to evaluate the impact of the increase in coinsurance in 2007 
as follows. Let ity  be the outcome of interest for individual i  at time t . At 𝑡𝑡 = 2006, no 
8 A continuous enrollment sample restriction is commonly used in the literature (Zhang, 2007; Chandra et al., 
2010b; Duarte, 2012). 
9 Alternatively, we can use the per treatment claim as an outcome. Unfortunately, there is no such information in 
the VHLSS 2006. 
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insured individual had to share the cost of treatment. At 𝑡𝑡 = 2008, the insured under VHI 
had to share 20 percent of the treatment cost and are assigned to the treated group, while all 
others form the control group. Let iVHI  be a binary indicator equal to one if individual i  is 
covered under the VHI scheme in 2008 and zero if otherwise. Therefore, an unobserved 
health care demand model is: 
)1(*22 3210 itiitittittit ucXVHIdVHIdy ++++++= γαααα  
where td2  is a dummy variable equal to one if 𝑡𝑡 = 2008, and zero if 𝑡𝑡 = 2006, and ic  is an 
unobservable time-invariant individual variable. The inclusion of the time dummy variable 
td2  is to control for any time trend in health care demand unrelated to the increase in 
coinsurance such as changes in availability of health care services or living environment. The 
presence of the individual heterogeneity, ic , in equation (1) recognises that enrolment in VHI 
might be correlated with individual characteristics that also affect health care utilisation. itX  
is a vector of all other individual socio-economic characteristics that are controlled for in the 
regression and itu  is an error term. We assume that 𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) = 0, 𝑡𝑡 = 2006, 2008. 
To eliminate the unobserved effect, ic , we first-difference equation )1(  as 
)2(222312 iiii uXVHIy ∆+∆++=∆ γαα  
The effect of the increase in coinsurance then can then be obtained by regressing the change 
in 𝑦𝑦 on the change in the 𝑋𝑋i variables and the VHI dummy. With panel data of two periods in 
time as in our study, the estimate of 3α  from equation )2(  is the DID estimator: it measures 
the effect of the introduction of the coinsurance provision for people covered under VHI. The 
first-difference (FD) estimator produces identical DID estimates as a fixed-effect estimator 
while both enjoy the advantage of panel data methods that control for unobserved time-
invariant factors that may affect both the control and treated groups (Wooldridge, 2010). Our 
difference-in-difference approach to study the impact of coinsurance is similar to that in 
Winkelmann (2004b), Zhang (2007), Chandra et al. (2010a) and Schreyögg and Grabka 
(2010). In our study, first-differencing is preferred since it also helps us to deal with the 
econometric issues associated with excess zeros of health outcomes (Winkelmann, 2008; 
Trivedi and Munkin, 2010). 
First-difference regressions help remove the endogeneity bias due to time-invariant 
unobserved characteristics such as attitudes toward risk, medical care and previous 
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experience with the health care system. The first-difference regression will, however, fail to 
remove all endogeneity bias if the unobserved variables that affect VHI enrolment and health 
care consumption are time-variant. There may be remaining time-varying shocks that could 
affect both VHI enrolment and health care consumption such as health care demand or supply 
shocks. 
To deal with possible endogeneity of continuous enrolment in VHI, we also employ an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach to estimating the first-difference equation (2). The 
challenge associated with this approach is to find a valid instrument that is correlated with 
enrolment in VHI but not with health care demand. At the time of this study, enrolment in 
VHI was group-based (see Section 2), so we follow Nguyen (2012) to use the proportion of 
people in the commune having VHI as an instrument variable for the VHI enrolment 
equation. For each individual, this variable is calculated as the ratio of people ages seven or 
older living in other households in the same commune having VHI. This commune-based 
variable is then used in association with a household-based dummy variable indicating 
whether any household member aged over seven, excluding the individual being considered, 
had CHI to predict the probability of a household member’s enrolment in VHI. Since this 
measure is commune-based it is arguably beyond the individual’s influence. The latter, 
however, seems appropriate since enrolment in CHI in Vietnam is sometimes considered as 
exogenous (Sepehri et al., 2006b). Together or in isolation, these measures are expected to be 
correlated with individuals’ enrolment in VHI but not with the error terms )( 2iu∆ . If they are 
valid instruments for the VHI equation, DID estimates of the first-difference model using 
instrumental variable methods will be consistent. In Section 5.2 we conduct tests for weak 
instruments and demonstrate their suitability for our purpose. 
4.2. Explanatory variables 
Given that the characteristics of individuals in the treated group may differ from those in the 
control groups, it is necessary to augment our specifications with the inclusion of a vector 
)(X  of additional explanatory variables. Throughout the models, we control for a number of 
socio-economic factors, which have been shown to influence the demand for health care 
(Grossman, 2000).10 In particular, we include age and gender implying that hospital visits 
increase with age and that women tend to have higher demand for health care. We further 
10 In the first-difference model, time-invariant variables such as gender, ethnicity, chronic disease, smoking and 
residential location are dropped. For completeness, these variables are explained here and will be used in 
Section 6. 
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control for household income to consider that demand for health care may increase with 
income. Following the literature dealing with income in developing countries, where income 
data are relatively scarce and may also be unreliable where they exist, we use per capita 
household expenditure as a proxy for income. We also include type of dwelling in the 
regressions to measure the impact of household assets on health care demand. 
We use both long-term and short-term indicators of health status: our long-term health status 
indicator is the existence of any chronic disease or limitation in functional ability11 and our 
short-term health status measure is a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual 
had had any illness in the 12 months before the survey period. In addition, the number of 
days the individuals had any illness in the previous 12 months provides another indicator of 
health status. Following the literature on health care demand, we also use information on 
smoking behaviour12 as a proxy for lifestyle decisions that may also affect the demand for 
health care (Doiron et al., 2008). 
The control variables also include the highest level of education attained, marital status, 
majority ethnicity, and household size. The inclusion of regional and rural/urban variables in 
the regressions is to control for heterogeneity in health care utilisation between regions (see 
Appendix Table 1 for variable definitions and Appendix Table 2 for summary statistics of 
main variables). 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 illustrates how health care utilisation for the treated and control groups developed 
between 2006 and 2008. In both years, individuals covered by CHI had higher health care 
utilisation as both outpatients and inpatients. For outpatient treatment, the number of visits 
decreased from 2006 to 2008 and this trend is statistically significant for the VHI group. A 
similar (but statistically insignificant) pattern is observed when the outcome is measured as 
the number of times the insured patients used their health insurance cards to pay for 
treatment. In contrast, we observe no clear pattern in the change of the number of inpatient 
11 The VHLSS 2006 provides a comprehensive description of an individual’s overall functional health on the 
basis of vision, hearing, memory or concentration, ambulation (ability to get around), dexterity (use of hands 
and fingers) and communication attributes. For each attribute, four possible responses are recorded: not difficult, 
a little difficult, very difficult and impossible. We classify an individual as one with any limitation in functional 
ability if having a little difficulty or more in any of above attributes.  
12 Information on smoking, chronic disease or disability is only available in the VHLSS 2006. We make use of 
our individual panel to assume that individuals who reported having ever smoked or having any chronic disease 
or being disabled in 2006 also had the same status in 2008.  
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treatments. Table 2 also shows the difference in the change in the outcomes between the 
treated group and the control group over the 2006-2008 period (DID). DID figures suggest 
that the re-introduction of the coinsurance provision in the VHI group reduced their 
outpatient visits by 0.26, as compared with the CHI group. This reduction is statistically 
significant. We however do not observe any significant reduction for other outcomes. We test 
whether these patterns hold when characteristics of individuals in the treated and control 
groups are accounted for in the next section. 
 [Table 2 about here] 
5.2. Regression results 
Table 3 presents DID estimates of the impact of the increase in coinsurance on health care 
demand using the CHI as a control group. The results are reported separately by treatment 
type (inpatient, outpatient) and estimator (FD and IV-FD).13 
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 shows that prior to using the IV we obtain a negative and insignificant estimate for 
the impact of the coinsurance provision on the number of outpatient treatments. A positive 
and insignificant impact, however, is observed when the outcome is measured by the number 
of times the insured patients use health insurance cards to pay for treatment. Instrumenting 
for VHI enrolment has a pronounced effect on the estimated impact. Specifically, it decreases 
the impact of coinsurance on the number of outpatient treatments. In addition, the estimated 
impact turns from positive to negative when the outcome is represented by the number of 
times that insured patients use their health insurance cards to pay for treatment. For both 
outcomes, however, the IV estimates are statistically insignificant.  
Prior to instrumenting we obtain a positive and insignificant estimate for inpatient treatment. 
This pattern holds when the outcome is measured by either the number of treatment or the 
number of times the health insurance card is used to pay for treatment. Instrumenting for VHI 
turns the impact from positive to negative but the impact is still statistically insignificant. We 
note that the OLS estimate was biased upward. This is consistent with a positive estimate of 
13 We implement a maximum likelihood (ML) estimator derived by Maddala (1983) to estimate the system of 
two equations: a probit equation for the probability of enroling in VHI and an OLS equation for the change in 
outcomes. We account for possible endogeneity of the VHI variable in the change in outcome equation by 
allowing errors in the two equations to be correlated. The endogeneity of the treatment variable can be tested 
using a t test for the significance of the correlation term. p values for this test are reported under the DID 
estimates. Instrumental variable first-difference estimates are obtained using treatreg syntax in Stata version 
13.0. 
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the correlation (rho) between errors in the treatment and outcome equations. The size of the 
bias is not negligible but the likelihood-ratio test at the bottom of the DID estimates indicates 
that in most cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two error terms are 
uncorrelated. An exception is observed when the outcome is measured by the number of 
times the insured patients use health insurance cards to pay for outpatient treatment. In this 
case, a positive and significant correlation between change in errors in the outcome equation 
and errors in the treatment equation is observed. 
Given the significant change in the estimated impact associated with the coinsurance 
provision in the instrumented regressions, special scrutiny of the results is warranted. First, 
we test for strength of the instruments by using a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test for joint 
significance of instruments. The results are reported in Table 3 and suggest that the 
instruments are empirically strong (Staiger and Stock, 1997). Second, we test for the 
assumption that the instruments are not correlated with the error term in the equation (2) by 
using an over-identification test. In all cases, Chi-squared test statistics in Table 3 show that 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with the instruments. 
Third, we use the proportion of people in the commune having VHI as a sole instrument, the 
results are almost the same as when two instruments are used. Finally, we implement a two-
stage estimator14 and compare the results with those obtained from the maximum likelihood 
estimator. Again the estimated impact is almost the same. 
In summary, we cannot find the expected (negative) impact of the increase in coinsurance 
provisions on the quantity of health care demanded by individuals covered under the 
voluntary scheme. This result is robust even when we account econometrically for the 
endogeneity of enrolment in VHI. 
5.3. Variation between sub-groups 
We examine whether the results are heterogeneous to sub-groups by reapplying the above 
regression models to each sub-group. We first examine whether price sensitivity varies with 
health status, as represented either by limitation in functional ability or having any illness, 
both measured in 2006.15 A priori, the heterogeneity in response to coinsurance by 
14 In the first stage, probit estimates are obtained for the treatment equation. From these estimates, the hazard is 
calculated for each observation. Consistent estimates of the first difference equation in the second stage are 
obtained by augmenting the regression equation with the hazard. Standard errors of the second stage are 
adjusted using a formula derived by Maddala (1983). We use treatreg syntax in Stata version 13.0 to produce 
two-stage instrumental variable estimates. Estimated results will be available upon request. 
15 We do not use the existence of any chronic condition to represent long term health condition in this 
experiment because only a small number of the VHI insured (86) have a chronic condition. 
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individual’s health status is vague. On the one hand, individuals with worse health may be 
more price sensitive because of potentially larger income effects. On the other hand, those 
with worse health may be less price sensitive because they may value health more. Results 
(reported in Table 4 – Panel 1) indicate that there is no noticeable difference in responses to 
the increase in coinsurance by disability status (for both outpatient and inpatient treatment) 
and by illness status (for inpatient treatment). We however observe some significant 
difference in responses when health status is measured by having any illness for outpatient 
treatment (Table 4 – Panel 2). In particular, individuals with better health (i.e. having no 
illness) appear to cut their number of outpatient treatment by 0.13 while those with worse 
health do not. This difference while not highly significant (at a 10 percent level) still holds 
when the endogeneity of VHI enrollment is dealt with since no endogeneity of VHI 
enrollment is detected.16 We also observe a similar trend when the outcome is measured by 
the number of times the health insurance card is used to pay for outpatient treatment. This 
difference however turns to insignificant when the endogeneity of VHI enrollment, which 
appears to be present, is controlled for. 
[Table 4 about here] 
We next investigate whether there is any difference in response to the imposition of 
coinsurance by gender. Results (reported in Table 4 – Panel 3) indicate no significant 
difference by gender for outpatient treatment. In contrast, significant difference in the effect 
of coinsurance by gender is noted for inpatient treatment when the endogeneity of VHI 
enrollment is not dealt with. Instrumenting for VHI enrollment however turns this gender 
difference to insignificant. The statistical significance of the correlation between the 
treatment and outcome equations suggests that the IV-FD result is preferred in this case, 
indicating there is no significant difference across genders for inpatient treatment. 
We also compare the influence of coinsurance across three different age groups: under 18, 
prime age (between 18 and 55), and old age (age over 55).17 Results (reported in Table 5 – 
Panel 1) show that when faced with a coinsurance provision, individuals under 18 years old 
were more likely to reduce treatment than were older individuals. In particular, individuals 
age under 18 cut their number of outpatient treatment by 0.6 (FD-IV result, which is 
preferred) while older individuals did not. Individuals age under 18 also decreased their times 
16 We also implement usual tests for the instrumental method as discussed in Section 5.2. Results of these tests 
which indicate that our instruments are valid will be available upon request. 
17 55 (60) is the legal retirement age for females (males) in Vietnam at the time of study. The results are robust 
when we use male legal retirement age.  
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to use the health insurance cards to pay for outpatient (by 0.3, FD-IV result) and inpatient (by 
0.4, FD-IV result) treatment while older individuals did not. Our finding of a different impact 
by age is in line with some other studies (Cherkin et al., 1989; Hsu et al., 2006; Duarte, 2012) 
which also find that older individuals are less likely to respond to cost-sharing than younger 
individuals. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Finally, we consider variation in response to the increase in coinsurance by three different 
income groups, measured by three household per capita expenditure quintiles which are in 
turn set at the 2006 level. Results (reported in Table 5 – Panel 2) show some significant 
differences in the impact of coinsurance increase on health care demand by income groups. 
For example, as compared to the CHI insured, the VHI insured decreased their number of 
outpatient treatment by about 0.9 after the increase in coinsurance if they were in the lowest 
income quintile. Similarly, they also reduced the number of times using their health insurance 
cards to pay for outpatient treatment by one (result from the regression controlling for 
endogeneity of VHI enrolment). In contrast, we observe some increase in the number of times 
the health insurance benefits are used for the insured under VHI in higher income groups. 
This difference in responses to coinsurance suggests that coinsurance would have a greater 
financial impact on low income individuals, a finding that is similar to the one found in 
Duarte (2012).   
6. Robustness checks 
6.1. Selection issues 
The key assumption of the DID methodology is that the allocation of the treatment and 
control groups does not change during the study period. Data show that, in practice, while 
most individuals did not change their health insurance status, some did switch between the 
treated and control groups from 2006 to 2008 (see Table 6). By selecting the sample of 
continuously insured individuals, we face a risk of excluding those whose response to the 
changed coinsurance provisions of the VHI scheme was to change their insurance status. If 
individuals dropped out of VHI schemes which had increased coinsurance provisions, and the 
individuals who moved have a higher-than-average price elasticity of health care demand our 
estimated impact will be biased downwards. This switch is more likely for those who 
anticipated using more health care after the increased coinsurance provisions were 
introduced. 
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[Table 6 about here] 
While the incentives just mentioned do exist, there are various factors suggesting that they 
will have small impact on the composition of the treated and control groups in our study. 
Firstly, we are able to observe movement between the treated and control groups (See Table 
6). Secondly, we directly test whether health factors affect the composition of the treated and 
control groups between 2006 and 2008. 
We apply the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model to a panel sample of individuals to examine 
the determinant of switching among treated and control groups during the 2006-2008 period. 
We begin investigating the dynamics of health insurance enrolment by specifying a baseline 
model that contains only variables measuring initial conditions (measured in 2006). These 
variables such as age, gender, smoking, sector of employment, schooling status and income 
are shown to be important in deciding health insurance enrolment. We then include variables 
that capture ‘changes’ in employment sector, schooling and income. The key variables we 
use to explore the possibility of adverse selection are measures of long-term and short-term 
health, our hypothesis being that ailing individuals are less likely to drop out of the VHI 
scheme after the increase in coinsurance.18 
Results for the impact of health variables on the movement among various states (uninsured, 
insured under CHI and insured under VHI) reported in Table 7 show that in all cases, we 
cannot find evidence to support the hypothesis that ailing individuals are more likely to drop 
out of VHI. Indeed, our health measures play no statistically significant role for those who 
switched from VHI to CHI (Column 6). In contrast, individuals with bad health as measured 
by the number of days ill are more likely to switch from CHI to VHI (Column 4). This health 
impact suggests that if the selection problem exists it may increase the estimated impact of 
coinsurance. It thus strengthens our result of no significantly negative impact of the increase 
in coinsurance on health care demand when the CHI is used as the control group. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Given that individuals with bad health are less likely to move out of the health insurance 
system (by remaining insured under either CHI (Column 3) or VHI (Column 5), it is not clear 
how this may influence the estimate using a sample of continuously insured under CHI or 
VHI. If individuals with bad health are more price sensitive than those in good health, our 
18 See Nguyen and Leung (2013) for details about model specifications and interpretations of the health 
insurance dynamics models. 
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DID estimate using the sample of continuously insured could underestimate the true impact 
of the coinsurance provision.  
Finally, we check for sample selection problems by applying a DID estimator to a cross 
section of data achieved by pooling data from two years. A DID estimator applied for 
repeated cross-section data in this robustness check is specified as follows: 
)3(2*2 3210 itittitiit XdVHIdVHIy µηββββ +++++=  
The notation for equation (3) is similar to that of equation (1). In equation (3), the effect of 
the increase in coinsurance is identified by 3β , which measures the change in health care 
demand of those with an increase in coinsurance compared with those who were exempt from 
coinsurance. Note that, as discussed in the sample restriction section (Section 3) when the 
pooled cross-section data are used, the timing of the movement among the treated and control 
groups is not taken into consideration. 
DID estimates for the pooled sample (reported in Table 8) show that the coinsurance 
provision has no significant impact on reducing health care demand.19 This result holds for 
different health care utilisation outcomes. An unexpected impact is observed when the 
number of inpatient treatments increases by about 0.021 for the treated group. However, this 
impact is not highly significant (at the 10 percent level). 
[Table 8 about here] 
6.2. Difference-in-difference matching  
In this section, we estimate the impact of the coinsurance provision by employing a DID 
matching strategy to the panel sample. To apply for a panel sample, the standard DID 
matching estimator proposed by Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) requires 
that there is no switch or change between the treated and control groups from 2006 to 2008. 
We thus apply it directly to our previously defined treated and control groups as we have 
done in Section 5 (i.e. continuously insured). Standard matching estimators assume that, after 
controlling for a set of observable characteristics, outcomes are conditionally mean 
independent of treatment. A DID matching strategy allows for invariant difference in 
unobserved characteristics between treated and control individuals (Heckman et al., 1997; 
Heckman et al., 1998). Smith and Todd (2005) find that the DID matching estimator for 
19 We use the OLS model to run this robust check. The results from the Poisson model are very similar to OLS 
results so we do not report them here. 
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panel data is more robust than traditional cross-section matching estimators. In addition, 
compared with the DID estimator, the DID matching estimator has the advantage of avoiding 
the imposition of functional form restrictions on the outcomes which usually require 
appropriate count data models. Thus it helps to avoid bias caused by misspecification of 
outcome functions. Furthermore, the DID method assumes that all other temporal factors 
affecting health care demand have the same impact for the insured under VHI and those in 
the control group. Thus we assume that any changes over time that we do not control for 
influence all individuals in the same way. The DID matching thus provides an indirect check 
for the common trend assumption since it matches individuals with similar characteristics 
which are measured in 2006. 
We use a probit regression to estimate the propensity score. To set the variables for the 
probability equation, we follow two rules. First, included explanatory variables should affect 
both treatment and outcomes. We therefore include gender, age, ethnicity, marital status, 
health status, achieved educational levels, household head status, house types, household size, 
household income, and regional and urban variables in the probit equation. Second, 
explanatory variables should be exogenous to the treatment so we measure them in 2006 
before the treatment.  
To assess the matching quality we use a two sample t-test to check if there are significant 
differences in variable means for both groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). After matching, 
the t-test shows no significant differences in covariates for both groups. Additionally, we use 
the likelihood ratio test on the joint significance of all variables in the propensity score 
function on the matched sample as suggested by Sianesi (2004). The test shows that after 
matching, the assumption of the joint significance of all variables is rejected. 
Results for the probit regressions of treatment are presented in Appendix Table 5. As 
compared with those remaining insured under CHI, individuals remaining insured under VHI 
are younger, wealthier, more likely to belong to an ethnic majority, be at school or work for 
formal economic sectors. No significant difference in health status between the two groups is 
observed.  
[Table 9 about here] 
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DID matching estimates are reported in Table 9. All impact estimates shown in Table 9 are 
statistically insignificant, indicating that our findings are robust to some functional form of 
outcomes.20 
6.3. Timing of VHLSS2006 
Some individuals in our sample were surveyed between May and August 2006 so some of 
their treatment could have been undertaken before the decrease in coinsurance in September 
2005 (see Section 2.2). Since we have no information about the timing of each treatment, it is 
likely that some of insured patients had to share 20 percent of costs of treatments that were 
undertaken between May and August 2005. Their shorter period of zero coinsurance 
experience before the increase in coinsurance in 2007 may explain why we could not find any 
significant impact above. In this section, we check for this possibility by excluding those 
surveyed between May and August 2006 from the panel sample and reapplying the regression 
models used in Section 5 to this sample. The results of this robustness check (reported in 
Table 10) show that, in all cases, there was no significant reduction impact of the re-
introduction of coinsurance provisions on health care demand.   
[Table 10 about here] 
6.4. The impact of 40 percent coinsurance for treatment above VND 7 million 
Recall, from Section 2.2, that before April 2007 a 40 percent coinsurance applied for VHI 
treatment costs above VND 7 million. This rear-end deductible is unlikely to have an impact 
on our results because insured patients are unlikely to know how much above the excess their 
treatment cost would be before deciding whether to receive treatment. Therefore, while the 
deductible may have some impact on OOP expenditure, it seems unlikely to have much 
impact on the probability of having a treatment. Note that our outcomes as measured by the 
number of visits also limit the impact of this coinsurance structure on the results.  
Furthermore, the excess benchmark is expected to apply to a small number of insured 
patients. This is because VND 7 million is high as it constitutes about 60 percent of Vietnam 
GDP per capita in 2006. From the VHLSS2006 data, although we do not know how much 
additional fee each insured patient had to pay when receiving treatment, we do know that 
only a small number of insured patients (13 percent) had to pay any extra for their treatment 
20 We examine the sensitivity of the DID matching estimates by using different matching methods including 1 
nearest neighbour, 5 nearest neighbours and kernel matching with a different bandwidth (0.0008). The estimated 
results are very similar. We do not report results for this sensitivity check here for brevity but the results will be 
available upon request. 
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cost possibly because their treatment cost was over VND 7 million. In an additional 
robustness check, we make sure that our results are not driven by this small number of 
individuals by dropping them from the panel sample and reapplying the regression models 
used in Section 5 to this sample. Results of this check, which are reported in Table 11, show 
our findings are still robust. 
[Table 11 about here] 
6.5. The common trend assumption 
The assumption of common trends in the impact evaluation literature using DID method 
requires that the change between 2006 and 2008 in health care use would have been the same 
for those in the treated group and the control group if the coinsurance had not changed in 
2007. In an ideal world, we would test this assumption by using data in two time periods 
before the policy change and demonstrate that the DID around a year in which policy did not 
change was zero. Unfortunately, given the available data in Vietnam and the change in cost-
sharing policy in 2005, this assumption is not easily tested. While there were some events 
that might have had different impact on health care demand between the treated group and 
the control group during the study period, as discussed below, they are unlikely to have any 
significant impact on our findings.  
For example, a different change in the health care provider incentive between the control and 
treated groups during the study period may violate the common trend assumption of the DID 
method. In Vietnam, while the scope for providers to induce demand for unnecessary services 
exists when they are paid on a fee-for-service basis (World Bank, 2007; Lieberman and 
Wagstaff, 2009; Nguyen et al., 2017), this payment basis was not changed during the study 
period. In addition, treatment fees for patients were unchanged during the study period. We 
therefore expect no change in provider – induced demand, for at least insured patients. 
Another event which may lead to a possible violation of the common trend assumption is the 
premium growth during the study period. Premiums for the insured under VHI were raised by 
around 80 percent between September 2005 and April 2007. At the same time, the nominal 
minimum wage which is used to calculate the salary and hence heath insurance premiums for 
the insured under CHI increased by about 41 percent. When we account for growth in the 
salary base of wage earners, the premium growth is almost the same for the insured under 
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VHI and CHI.21 We therefore expect that changes in premium during the study period to have 
a similar impact on health care demand of the insured under VHI and CHI.  
7. Discussion and conclusions 
In this study, we examine the impact of re-introducing a 20 percent coinsurance provision for 
VHI holders on health care demand in Vietnam. We apply a DID, DID instrumental variable 
and DID matching framework to the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS data by using the insured under 
compulsory schemes as a control group. 
The results suggest that there was no significant reduction in health care demand for the VHI 
group following the re-introduction of co-insurance. This finding holds for both outpatient 
and inpatient treatment. Our finding is robust when the movement among treated and control 
groups is taken into account. Overall, the 20 percent coinsurance provision is found to have 
no intended impact on health care demand. By sub-group, we find insignificant differences in 
responses by health status and gender. We however find that those who were under 18 or in 
low income households reduced their health care use after the increase in coinsurance.  
The finding that the 20 percent coinsurance provision did not reduce the quantity of health 
care demanded is not in line with what has usually been found in developed countries. This 
finding however is consistent with health care conditions in the developing world. Possibly, 
at a lower level of development, people only go to see a doctor when it is very necessary 
(O'Donnell, 2007), and this kind of demand is rather inelastic (Manning et al., 1987; Duarte, 
2012). This lack of impact may also be due to the presence of other monetary and non-
monetary costs associated with any medical treatment in the developing world. Such costs 
include those monetary costs not covered by the insurance policy, transportation time and 
costs, and waiting costs may represent an important fraction of total costs faced by the 
patients. This is true for Vietnam since for those who were supposed to be exempted from 
treatment free (the CHI insured) in 2008, OOP payments still accounted for more than half of 
total treatment cost.22 A 20 percent coinsurance provision thus induces a small relative 
change in total costs, but may be too small to induce observable change in behaviour. In 
addition, there is a lack of adequate health care, especially at high levels of the health care 
21 Wages for wage earners are calculated as the product of the minimum wage and a salary base. The latter is 
proxy for a labourer’s productivity and assumed to increase overtime. 
22 In particular, according to the 2008 VHLSS data (see Appendix Table 6), for the insured under CHI, OOP 
payment represents 54 percent of total treatment cost for inpatient treatment and 53 percent for outpatient 
treatment. The figure is higher for the insured under VHI who have to pay 66 percent of total treatment cost for 
outpatient treatment and 59 percent for inpatient treatment. 
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system,23 and therefore this limits the over-use of health care in Vietnam, which may also 
explain the insignificant impact of the coinsurance provision on health care demand. It is also 
possible that this coinsurance policy is immature so the impact may not yet be observable. 
The result is consistent with the status of the health fund as in 2009 the fund was still in 
deficit despite efforts such as increasing the coinsurance rate. Our result is thus consistent 
with that of other studies on the impact of user fees on health care demand in developing 
countries where it usefulness depends on meeting several quantity, quality, information and 
cultural conditions (James et al., 2006).   
Our findings, and those of a number of other studies, suggest that cost-sharing is a blunt 
instrument for controlling moral hazard among the insured in developing countries. These 
findings may have important policy implications for health care financing in developing 
countries: a requirement that insured patients share the costs of treatment can be implemented 
without reducing their utilisation of health care. Thus setting co-payments according to the 
ability of insureds to pay offers a way of extending health care financing and perhaps 
insurance coverage. Of course, it is also well-known that out-of-pocket payments are usually 
regressive sources of health care financing in the developing world. In further work, the 
effect of the policy change on the distribution of health care services and health care 
financing is thus also deserving of further attention.  
 
 
23 In 2009, central, provincial and district hospitals on average operated at 150, 125 and 115 percent over the 
capacity (as measured by bed occupancy rates over allowable beds), respectively (Vietnamnet, 2009). 
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Table 1: Components of Vietnam health insurance system, 2006 - 2008 
Scheme Targeted 
population 
Financing Cost-sharing policies Percent of 
population insured 
under(*) 
   Before 2007 reform After 2007 reform 2006 2008 
       
C
om
pu
ls
or
y 
he
al
th
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
(C
H
I) 
Civil servants  
and employees in 
the formal sector 
(SHI) 
3 percent salary 
(2 percent paid 
by employer and 
1 percent by 
employee) 
- 0 percent 
coinsurance for 
treatment costing 
under 7 mil VND 
- 40 percent 
coinsurance for 
treatment costing 
more than 7 mil VND 
- Claim limit of 20 
mil VND per 
treatment 
 
The same as before 9 10 
Pensioners 3 percent of 
monthly 
allowances, paid 
by VSS with 
subsidies from 
state budget 
- 0 percent 
coinsurance for 
treatment costing 
under 20 mil VND 
-Claim limit of 20 mil 
VND per treatment 
 
The same as before  3 5 
Meritorious 
people 
3 percent of 
minimum wage, 
paid from state 
budget 
- 0 percent 
coinsurance 
- No claim limit per 
treatment  
The same as before 
Health care for 
the poor (HCFP) 
Central 
government 
budget (75 
percent) and 
provincial budget 
(25 percent) 
- 0 percent 
coinsurance for 
treatment costing 
under 20 mil VND 
-Claim limit of 20 mil 
VND per treatment 
 
The same as before 19 14 
Free health care 
for children age 
below six 
Central 
government 
budget 
- 0 percent 
coinsurance 
- No claim limit per 
treatment 
 
The same as before 3 7 
       
V
ol
un
ta
ry
 h
ea
lth
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
(V
H
I) 
Students VND 120,000 
(urban). VND 
100,000 (rural). 
Paid by parents. 
 
- 0 percent 
coinsurance for 
treatment costing 
under 7 mil VND 
- 40 percent 
coinsurance for 
treatment costing 
more than 7 mil VND 
- Claim limit of 20 
mil VND per 
treatment 
- Outpatient 
treatment: 0 percent 
coinsurance for 
treatment costing  
under 100,000 VND; 
20 percent 
coinsurance for 
treatment costing 
above  
-  Inpatient treatment: 
20 percent 
coinsurance with 
claim limit of 20 mil 
VND per treatment 
15 15 
Others (non-
students) 
VND 320,000 
(urban). VND 
240,000 (rural). 
Paid by enrollee. 
4 6 
Notes: (*) Calculations from VHLSS 2006 and 2008, sample weights are used. Premiums are measured in 2006.  
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Table 2: Health care utilization by treated - control groups and year 
    
 
  Treated group (VHI) 
 
Control group (CHI)  
Type of 
treatment 
 
Outcome 
 
2006 2008 08-06(a) 
 
2006 2008 08-06(a) DID(a) 
            Outpatient 
 
A 
 
1.18 0.89 -0.29*** 
 
1.32 1.29 -0.03 -0.26*** 
  
B 
 
0.56 0.53 -0.03 
 
0.87 0.85 -0.02 -0.01 
            Inpatient 
 
A 
 
0.08 0.10 0.02 
 
0.14 0.14 0.00 0.02 
    B   0.05 0.07 0.02 
 
0.12 0.11 -0.01 0.03 
Notes:  - Outcomes: A - Number of treatment; B - Number of times the health insurance card is used to pay for 
treatment. 
- DID: the difference in the outcome between the treated and respective control groups after and before 
the increase in coinsurance. 
- (a) t tests were performed on the significance of the difference between the sample mean 
between two years within the group and between the treated and respective control groups 
over two years. The symbol * denotes significance at the 10 % level, ** at the 5 % level, and 
*** at the 1 % level. 
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Table 3: Impact of increase in coinsurance on health care utilization - FD versus IV-FD 
method 
    
Outpatient treatment   Inpatient treatment 
Outcome 
 
Estimate 
 
FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD 
         A 
 
DID 
 
-0.190 -0.460 
 
0.051 -0.004 
    
(-1.11) (-1.29) 
 
(1.01) (-0.08) 
         
  
Rho 
  
0.051 
  
0.063 
  
P value 
  
0.302 
  
0.173 
         
  
Chi squared 1 
  
281.8 
  
283.2 
  
P value 1 
  
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
Chi squared 2 
  
3.457 
  
1.002 
  
P value 2 
  
0.178 
  
0.606 
B 
 
DID 
 
0.182 -0.349 
 
0.031 -0.023 
    
(1.30) (-0.50) 
 
(1.30) (-0.43) 
         
  
Rho 
  
0.127** 
  
0.068 
  
P-value 
  
0.042 
  
0.145 
  
Chi squared 1 
  
251.2 
  
283.9 
  
P value 1 
  
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
Chi squared 2 
  
0.465 
  
0.945 
  
P value 2 
  
0.793 
  
0.623 
Notes:  
- FD estimate is obtained by means of an OLS regression of the change in the outcome on the treatment 
dummy and change in X's. 
- IV estimate is obtained by means of a maximum likelihood regression of the change in the outcome on the 
treatment dummy (endogenous variable) and change in X's. 
- X's include age, marital status, number of days ill last year, achieved education levels, household head 
status, house types, household size, household income and urban.  
- Results for remaining variables are reported in Appendix Table 3 and 4. 
- Robust t-statistics are in brackets and adjusted for clustering at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
- Rho is the estimate of correlation between errors in the treatment and outcome equations. 
- P value from the LR test for the null hypothesis that the two error terms are uncorrelated (rho=0). 
- Chi squared 1: Chi squared values of LR tests for joint significance of instruments; Chi squared 2: Chi 
squared values of LR tests for over-identification restrictions; P value: probability value for the LR test. 
- Outcomes: A - Number of treatment; B - Number of times the health insurance card is used to pay for 
treatment.  
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Table 4: Impact of increase in coinsurance on health care utilization, by health status and 
gender 
  
Outpatient treatment 
 
Inpatient treatment 
  
FD IV-FD FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD FD IV-FD 
Panel 1: by disability No disability Any disability 
 
No disability Any disability 
A DID -0.207 -0.330* -0.115 -3.534 
 
0.035 -0.075 1.137* -4.731 
  
(-1.29) (-1.73) (-0.17) (-0.89) 
 
(0.29) (-0.39) (1.95) (-1.21) 
           
 
Rho 
 
0.03 
 
0.30 
  
0.04 
 
0.62 
 
P value 
 
0.46 
 
0.25 
  
0.43 
 
0.00 
           B DID 0.016 -0.043 0.223 0.217 
 
-0.003 -0.022 0.208 0.124 
  
(0.84) (-0.81) (1.43) (1.48) 
 
(-0.18) (-0.40) (1.32) (0.71) 
           
 
Rho 
 
0.09 
 
0.00 
  
0.03 
 
0.05 
 
P value 
 
0.12 
 
0.98 
  
0.62 
 
0.66 
 
Observations 4573 4573 910 910 
 
4573 4573 910 910 
           Panel 2: by illness No illness Any illness 
 
No illness Any illness 
A DID -0.133* -0.019 -0.066 -0.203 
 
0.020 0.033 0.094 -0.026 
  
(-1.74) (-0.02) (-0.21) (-0.33) 
 
(1.14) (1.07) (1.04) (-0.21) 
           
 
Rho 
 
-0.06 
 
0.02 
  
-0.03 
 
0.10 
 
P value 
 
0.65 
 
0.80 
  
0.63 
 
0.15 
           B DID -0.150** 0.409 0.591** -0.443 
 
0.011 0.017 0.063 -0.048 
  
(-2.41) (0.76) (2.24) (-0.28) 
 
(0.69) (0.72) (1.42) (-0.44) 
           
 
Rho 
 
-0.35 
 
0.18 
  
-0.02 
 
0.10 
 
P value 
 
0.01 
 
0.07 
  
0.81 
 
0.14 
 
Observations 2620 2620 2865 2865 
 
2620 2620 2865 2865 
           Panel 3: by gender Female Male 
 
Female Male 
A DID -0.234 -0.157 -0.150 -0.874 
 
0.076** -0.154 0.016 0.059 
  
(-0.98) (-0.33) (-0.68) (-1.01) 
 
(2.19) (-1.09) (0.45) (1.49) 
           
 
Rho 
 
-0.01 
 
0.14 
  
0.25 
 
-0.05 
 
P value 
 
0.85 
 
0.10 
  
0.00 
 
0.37 
           B DID 0.146 -0.196 0.201 -1.480 
 
0.065* -0.165 -0.014 0.017 
  
(0.79) (-0.60) (1.21) (-0.39) 
 
(1.95) (-0.62) (-0.44) (0.49) 
           
 
Rho 
 
0.09 
 
0.38 
  
0.27 
 
-0.04 
 
P value 
 
0.18 
 
0.03 
  
0.00 
 
0.45 
  Observations 2761 2761 2724 2724   2761 2761 2724 2724 
Notes: see Table 3.
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Table 5: Impact of increase in coinsurance on health care utilization, by age and income 
  
Outpatient treatment 
 
Inpatient treatment 
  
FD IV-FD FD IV-FD FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD FD IV-FD FD IV-FD 
Panel 1: by age Age <18 Age 18-55 Age>55 
 
Age <18 Age 18-55 Age>55 
A DID -0.243** -0.624*** -0.320 -0.347 0.081 0.609 
 
0.020 0.038 0.082* -0.025 0.097 0.121 
  
(-2.28) (-3.32) (-0.76) (-0.84) (0.10) (0.60) 
 
(1.14) (1.02) (1.70) (-0.41) (0.68) (0.94) 
               
 
Rho 
 
0.15 
 
0.00 
 
-0.05 
  
-0.04 
 
0.12 
 
-0.02 
 
P value 
 
0.00 
 
0.93 
 
0.45 
  
0.53 
 
0.07 
 
0.75 
               B DID -0.041 -0.266* 0.176 0.113 1.167 1.128 
 
0.011 -0.365** 0.059 0.010 0.021 -0.000 
  
(-0.48) (-1.90) (0.66) (0.37) (1.60) (1.07) 
 
(0.66) (-2.50) (1.38) (0.18) (0.16) (-0.00) 
               
 
Rho 
 
0.13 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 
  
0.74 
 
0.06 
 
0.01 
 
P value 
 
0.03 
 
0.75 
 
0.96 
  
0.00 
 
0.37 
 
0.82 
 
Observations 2190 2190 2479 2479 815 815 
 
2190 2190 2478 2478 815 815 
               Panel 2: by income Low Medium High 
 
Low Medium High 
A DID -0.679** -0.917** 0.203 0.221 0.570 0.631 
 
-0.004 0.009 0.093** -0.018 0.122* 0.116* 
  
(-2.51) (-2.45) (0.62) (0.38) (0.96) (1.07) 
 
(-0.07) (0.13) (2.04) (-0.08) (1.85) (1.78) 
               
 
Rho 
 
0.06 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.01 
  
-0.02 
 
0.12 
 
0.01 
 
P value 
 
0.38 
 
0.97 
 
0.88 
  
0.79 
 
0.31 
 
0.92 
               B DID -0.134 -0.971*** 0.130 0.209 1.302** 1.284** 
 
0.015 0.016 0.019 -0.512* 0.100* 0.108* 
  
(-0.97) (-3.00) (0.49) (0.45) (2.36) (2.28) 
 
(0.28) (0.25) (0.50) (-1.77) (1.66) (1.81) 
               
 
Rho 
 
0.27 
 
-0.02 
 
0.00 
  
-0.00 
 
0.61 
 
-0.01 
 
P value 
 
0.00 
 
0.82 
 
0.95 
  
0.98 
 
0.01 
 
0.88 
  Observations 2368 2368 1465 1465 1651 1651   2368 2368 1463 1463 1652 1652 
Notes: see Table 3.
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Table 6: Transition matrix in health insurance status (frequency and relative frequency) 
  
Insurance status in 2008 
  
Uninsured CHI VHI Total 
  
    
In
su
ra
nc
e 
st
at
us
 in
 2
00
6 
Uninsured 5,157 804 815 6,776 
  (78) (17) (29) (48) 
      
CHI 686 3,686 186 4,558 
  (10) (78) (7) (32) 
      
VHI 738 242 1,801 2,781 
  (11) (5) (64) (20) 
      
Total 6,581 4,732 2,802 14,115 
  (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Notes:   
- Number in parentheses is the percent of respective column (relative frequency).  
- Sample: panel sample of individuals whose age in 2006 was seven or more. 
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Table 7: Impact of health variables on health insurance dynamics 
  
Uninsured in 
2006(a) 
 Insured under CHI 
in 2006(b) 
 Insured under VHI 
in 2006(c) 
Variables  
to CHI 
2008 
to VHI 
2008 
 to 
uninsured 
2008 
to VHI 
2008 
 to 
uninsured 
2008 
to CHI 
2008 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Ill last year 
 
0.94 0.97 
 
0.73*** 0.76 
 
0.79** 1.29 
  
(-0.39) (-0.26) 
 
(-2.98) (-1.29) 
 
(-2.05) (1.13) 
Number of days ill 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.01** 
 
1.02** 1.01 
  
(0.10) (1.35) 
 
(0.95) (2.20) 
 
(2.45) (0.66) 
Disable 
 
1.08 1.43** 
 
0.78** 0.68 
 
1.01 0.98 
  
(0.50) (2.13) 
 
(-2.28) (-1.44) 
 
(0.05) (-0.06) 
Chronic 
 
1.34 1.37** 
 
0.78 1.11 
 
0.70*** 1.73 
  
(1.36) (2.16) 
 
(-1.13) (0.33) 
 
(-2.90) (1.52) 
Notes:  
(a) Remaining uninsured is set as the base group 
(b) Remaining insured under CHI is set as the base group 
(c) Remaining insured under CHI is set as the base group 
- Regression from multinomial logit model; Relative Risk Ratios are reported; Robust t-statistics are in 
brackets and adjusted for clustering at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
- Results for remaining variables are reported in Appendix Table 5. 
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Table 8: Impact of increase in coinsurance on health care demand - DID estimates for the 
pooled sample 
Outcome 
 
Outpatient 
 
Inpatient 
A 
 
-0.104 
 
0.021* 
  
(-1.15) 
 
(1.67) 
     B 
 
0.032 
 
0.018 
  
(0.48) 
 
(1.65) 
Notes:  
- Sample size: 26,276 with 3,097 individuals in treated group in 2008 
- OLS estimate is obtained by means of a regression of the outcome on the treatment dummy, year dummy, 
interaction between treatment and year dummies and X's. 
- X's include gender, age, ethnicity, marital status, ill last year, number of days ill last year, achieved 
education levels, household head status, house types, household size, household income, regions and urban. 
- Robust t-statistics are in brackets and adjusted for clustering at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
- Outcomes: A - Number of treatment; B - Number of times the health insurance card is used to pay for 
treatment. 
- Sample: pool sample of all individuals age 7 or older in each year. 
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Table 9: Impact of increase in coinsurance on health care demand - DID matching estimates 
Outcome 
 
Outpatient 
 
Inpatient 
          A 
 
-0.027 
 
0.025 
  
(-0.09) 
 
(0.65) 
     B 
 
0.248 
 
-0.003 
  
(1.22) 
 
(-0.09) 
Notes:  
- Results from DID matching using kernel matching method with bandwidth = 0.0004. 
- T-statistics are reported in brackets and calculated using bootstrap with 500 replications. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
- Outcomes: A - Number of treatment; B - Number of times the health insurance card is used to pay for 
treatment. 
- Sample: balanced panel of individuals age 7 or older in 2006. 
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Table 10: Impact of increase in coinsurance on health care utilization - Robustness check 3 
    
Outpatient treatment   Inpatient treatment 
Outcome 
 
Estimate 
 
FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD 
A 
 
DID 
 
-0.122 -0.103 
 
0.052* -0.040 
    
(-0.43) (-0.22) 
 
(1.68) (-0.20) 
  
Rho 
  
-0.003 
  
0.108 
  
P value 
  
0.961 
  
0.323 
B 
 
DID 
 
0.269 0.327 
 
0.026 0.005 
    
(1.18) (0.91) 
 
(0.95) (0.03) 
         
  
Rho 
  
-0.014 
  
0.026 
  
P-value 
  
0.818 
  
0.812 
Notes: - Sample size: 2,722 with 909 individuals in treated group.  
- Other notes: See Table 3. 
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Table 11: Impact of increase in coinsurance on health care utilization - Robustness check 4 
    
Outpatient treatment   Inpatient treatment 
Outcome 
 
Estimate 
 
FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD 
A 
 
DID 
 
-0.150 -0.432 
 
0.047* 0.053 
    
(-0.88) (-1.15) 
 
(1.88) (1.27) 
  
Rho 
  
0.054 
  
-0.008 
  
P value 
  
0.286 
  
0.868 
B 
 
DID 
 
0.201 -0.320 
 
0.028 0.038 
    
(1.42) (-0.45) 
 
(1.26) (1.12) 
  
Rho 
  
0.128** 
  
-0.013 
  
P-value 
  
0.044 
  
0.768 
         Notes: - Sample size: 5,240 with 1,725 individuals in treated group. 
- Other notes: See Table 3. 
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Appendix Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable name Variable definitions 
Age Current age (in years)/10 
Age squared Age squared (in years squared)/100 
Male Dummy = 1 if male, = 0 if female (the base group) 
Married Dummy = 1 if married, widowed, divorced or separated; =0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Kinh Ethnicity Dummy = 1 if Kinh or Chinese; = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Education Achieved levels of education: no education (the base group), primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, university or higher 
Training Dummy = 1 if obtained long-term vocational training or professional high school, = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Ill last year Dummy = 1 if have any illness in the last 12 months; = 0 if have no illness (the base group) 
Number of days ill The number of days ill last year 
Chronic Dummy = 1 if has any chronic disease, e.g. diabetes, hepatitis, = 0 if have no chronic disease (the base group) 
Disable Dummy = 1 if have any difficulty in one of the seven functional ability; = 0 if have no difficulty (the base group) 
Smoking Dummy = 1 if have ever smoked; = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Private sector Dummy = 1 if working for wage in the private sector; = 0 if not working for wage in this sector (the base group) 
Public sector Dummy = 1 if working for wage in the public sector (including SOEs); = 0 if not working for wage in this sector (the base group) 
At school Dummy = 1 if currently at school or on vacation, = 0 if currently not at school (the base group) 
Household head Dummy = 1 if is the head of the household, = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Household size Number of household members 
Household income Comparable real total expenditure per capita in Mil VND (adjusted for monthly and regional price differences) 
Semi-permanent house Dummy = 1 if is the dwelling is classified as semi-permanent, = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Permanent house Dummy = 1 if is the dwelling is classified as permanent, = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Any CHI in the household Dummy variable = 1 if any household member age over 6, excluding the individual being considered, has CHI, = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Commune VHI ratio The ratio of people age seven or older living in other households at the same commune having VHI 
Region Eight residential regions: Northeast (the base group), Red River Delta, Northwest, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, Central Highlands, 
Southeast and Mekong River Delta 
Urban Dummy = 1 if residential area is urban, = 0 if rural (the base group) 
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Appendix Table 2: Summary statistics table by treated - control status 
 
 VHI 
 
CHI 
Variables  Total 2006 2008 
 
Total 2006 2008 
Male 
 
0.48 0.48 0.48 
 
0.50 0.50 0.50 
Age/10 
 
2.00 1.90 2.10 
 
3.91 3.82 4.01 
Kinh 
 
0.97 0.97 0.97 
 
0.58 0.58 0.58 
Married  
 
0.15 0.15 0.15 
 
0.71 0.70 0.72 
Disable 
 
0.08 0.08 0.08 
 
0.21 0.21 0.21 
Chronic 
 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
0.12 0.12 0.12 
Smoking 
 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
0.30 0.30 0.30 
Ill last year 
 
0.50 0.53 0.47 
 
0.52 0.52 0.52 
Number of days ill 
 
1.06 0.60 1.52 
 
2.56 2.03 3.08 
Primary education 
 
0.38 0.39 0.37 
 
0.23 0.23 0.23 
Lower secondary education 
 
0.28 0.26 0.30 
 
0.21 0.20 0.22 
Upper secondary  
 
0.17 0.11 0.23 
 
0.15 0.14 0.15 
College and higher  
 
0.01 0.00 0.01 
 
0.10 0.10 0.10 
Has training  
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
0.10 0.11 0.10 
Household head   
 
0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
0.36 0.35 0.36 
Public sector employee 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
0.19 0.20 0.18 
Private sector employee 
 
0.01 0.00 0.01 
 
0.04 0.04 0.05 
At school      
 
0.80 0.83 0.77 
 
0.16 0.18 0.14 
Semi-permanent house  
 
0.59 0.60 0.58 
 
0.60 0.58 0.62 
Permanent house 
 
0.34 0.32 0.36 
 
0.20 0.20 0.20 
Income per capita 
 
7.85 6.73 8.96 
 
6.12 5.23 7.02 
Household size  
 
4.76 4.79 4.73 
 
4.97 5.01 4.93 
Northeast  
 
0.10 0.10 0.10 
 
0.23 0.23 0.23 
Northwest  
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
0.14 0.14 0.14 
North central coast  
 
0.14 0.14 0.14 
 
0.11 0.11 0.11 
South central coast  
 
0.14 0.14 0.14 
 
0.08 0.08 0.08 
Central highlands 
 
0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
0.13 0.13 0.13 
Southeast  
 
0.17 0.17 0.17 
 
0.08 0.08 0.08 
Mekong River Delta 
 
0.16 0.16 0.16 
 
0.10 0.10 0.10 
Urban  
 
0.33 0.32 0.34 
 
0.23 0.22 0.23 
Any CHI in the household 0.37 0.37 0.37 
 
0.48 0.48 0.48 
Commune VHI ratio 
 
0.29 0.29 0.29 
 
0.13 0.13 0.13 
Number of observations  3602 1801 1801   7372 3686 3686 
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Appendix Table 3: Impact of increase in coinsurance on health care utilization - FD versus IV-FD method: results for remaining variables 
  
Outpatient 
 
Inpatient 
  
A 
 
B 
 
A 
 
B 
  
FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD 
Variables 
 
  Outcome Treatment 
 
  Outcome Treatment 
 
  Outcome Treatment 
 
  Outcome Treatment 
Any CHI in the household 
   
-0.257*** 
   
-0.256*** 
   
-0.264*** 
   
-0.264*** 
    
(-3.64) 
   
(-3.66) 
   
(-3.71) 
   
(-3.72) 
Commune VHI ratio 
   
3.143*** 
   
3.128*** 
   
3.143*** 
   
3.145*** 
    
(16.28) 
   
(15.28) 
   
(16.28) 
   
(16.30) 
Age 
 
-0.917 -0.968 -0.561 
 
-0.118 -0.219 -0.588 
 
0.049 0.039 -0.538 
 
-0.109 -0.120 -0.559 
  
(-0.74) (-0.79) (-0.80) 
 
(-0.12) (-0.22) (-0.84) 
 
(0.21) (0.17) (-0.77) 
 
(-0.52) (-0.56) (-0.80) 
Married  
 
0.041 0.018 -0.226 
 
0.029 -0.017 -0.219 
 
0.035 0.030 -0.207 
 
0.039 0.034 -0.209 
  
(0.16) (0.07) (-0.91) 
 
(0.22) (-0.13) (-0.88) 
 
(0.65) (0.56) (-0.85) 
 
(0.83) (0.72) (-0.85) 
Number of days ill 
 
0.005 0.005 0.001 
 
0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.001 
 
0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001 
  
(0.99) (1.01) (1.06) 
 
(0.58) (0.62) (0.95) 
 
(4.52) (4.51) (0.96) 
 
(3.75) (3.74) (0.88) 
Education 
 
-0.105 -0.098 0.086* 
 
-0.017 -0.003 0.089* 
 
0.016 0.018 0.086* 
 
0.028** 0.030** 0.086* 
  
(-1.17) (-1.08) (1.79) 
 
(-0.21) (-0.04) (1.84) 
 
(1.10) (1.19) (1.78) 
 
(2.16) (2.27) (1.79) 
Training 
 
0.343 0.348 0.178 
 
0.226 0.237 0.171 
 
0.044 0.045 0.183 
 
0.059** 0.060** 0.185 
  
(1.61) (1.63) (1.36) 
 
(1.42) (1.49) (1.29) 
 
(1.36) (1.39) (1.40) 
 
(2.08) (2.12) (1.41) 
Household head 
 
-0.263 -0.270 -0.119 
 
0.074 0.060 -0.142 
 
0.228 0.226 -0.135 
 
0.240 0.239 -0.138 
  
(-0.42) (-0.43) (-0.45) 
 
(0.13) (0.10) (-0.53) 
 
(1.52) (1.51) (-0.52) 
 
(1.39) (1.38) (-0.54) 
House type 
 
0.056 0.055 -0.051 
 
0.067 0.065 -0.052 
 
-0.009 -0.009 -0.048 
 
-0.012 -0.013 -0.049 
  
(0.51) (0.50) (-0.73) 
 
(0.79) (0.76) (-0.75) 
 
(-0.52) (-0.54) (-0.69) 
 
(-0.76) (-0.77) (-0.70) 
Household size 
 
-0.095 -0.093 0.043 
 
-0.113 -0.110 0.042 
 
0.007 0.007 0.041 
 
0.004 0.005 0.041 
  
(-1.13) (-1.11) (1.04) 
 
(-1.58) (-1.56) (1.03) 
 
(0.57) (0.60) (1.00) 
 
(0.45) (0.48) (1.00) 
Income 
 
0.006** 0.006** 0.004* 
 
0.001 0.002 0.004* 
 
0.001** 0.001** 0.004* 
 
0.001* 0.001** 0.004* 
  
(2.22) (2.28) (1.88) 
 
(0.60) (0.88) (1.90) 
 
(1.97) (2.06) (1.90) 
 
(1.90) (1.98) (1.89) 
Urban 
 
0.183 0.239 0.738 
 
0.001 0.111 0.745 
 
-0.024 -0.013 0.780 
 
0.098 0.110 0.775 
  
(0.30) (0.39) (1.44) 
 
(0.00) (0.18) (1.49) 
 
(-0.10) (-0.05) (1.46) 
 
(0.47) (0.53) (1.45) 
Enrolling school(d) 
 
-0.104 -0.042 1.170*** 
 
-0.305* -0.183 1.173*** 
 
-0.057 -0.045 1.171*** 
 
-0.069* -0.056 1.167*** 
  
(-0.53) (-0.20) (7.05) 
 
(-1.90) (-0.77) (7.12) 
 
(-1.39) (-1.06) (7.06) 
 
(-1.79) (-1.43) (7.04) 
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Outpatient 
 
Inpatient 
  
A 
 
B 
 
A 
 
B 
  
FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD 
 
FD IV-FD 
Variables 
 
  Outcome Treatment 
 
  Outcome Treatment 
 
  Outcome Treatment 
 
  Outcome Treatment 
Leaving school(d) 
 
-0.025 0.049 1.081*** 
 
-0.222 -0.077 1.084*** 
 
0.009 0.024 1.087*** 
 
-0.002 0.013 1.087*** 
  
(-0.14) (0.26) (12.16) 
 
(-1.51) (-0.31) (12.29) 
 
(0.25) (0.68) (12.18) 
 
(-0.05) (0.38) (12.19) 
Remaining at school(d) 
 
-0.099 0.065 1.914*** 
 
-0.316** 0.007 1.913*** 
 
-0.050* -0.017 1.917*** 
 
-0.040* -0.007 1.917*** 
  
(-0.59) (0.26) (30.76) 
 
(-2.31) (0.02) (30.79) 
 
(-1.96) (-0.46) (30.75) 
 
(-1.68) (-0.19) (30.75) 
Becoming a wage earner (public) (e) 
 
0.165 0.129 -0.920*** 
 
-0.303 -0.373 -0.920*** 
 
-0.031 -0.038 -0.917*** 
 
-0.061* -0.068** -0.918*** 
  
(0.39) (0.30) (-2.77) 
 
(-1.22) (-1.45) (-2.80) 
 
(-0.66) (-0.81) (-2.75) 
 
(-1.86) (-2.04) (-2.75) 
Becoming a non-wage earner (public) (e) 
 
-0.259 -0.281 -0.826** 
 
-0.018 -0.061 -0.813** 
 
-0.067 -0.071 -0.813** 
 
-0.068 -0.072 -0.813** 
  
(-0.58) (-0.63) (-2.19) 
 
(-0.08) (-0.27) (-2.11) 
 
(-1.26) (-1.32) (-2.19) 
 
(-1.28) (-1.35) (-2.20) 
Remaining a wage earner (public) (e) 
 
0.094 0.053 -2.078*** 
 
-0.042 -0.123 -2.057*** 
 
0.000 -0.008 -2.092*** 
 
-0.015 -0.023 -2.083*** 
  
(0.49) (0.28) (-7.85) 
 
(-0.33) (-0.85) (-7.64) 
 
(0.00) (-0.30) (-7.96) 
 
(-0.60) (-0.85) (-7.85) 
Becoming a wage earner (private) (f) 
 
0.397 0.400 -0.066 
 
-0.268 -0.261 -0.065 
 
-0.073 -0.072 -0.063 
 
-0.083 -0.082 -0.064 
  
(0.94) (0.94) (-0.25) 
 
(-0.93) (-0.90) (-0.25) 
 
(-1.05) (-1.04) (-0.24) 
 
(-1.21) (-1.21) (-0.25) 
Becoming a non-wage earner (private) (f) 
 
-0.472 -0.466 -0.433 
 
0.133 0.146 -0.421 
 
-0.065 -0.063 -0.450 
 
0.019 0.020 -0.444 
  
(-1.00) (-0.99) (-1.34) 
 
(0.62) (0.69) (-1.31) 
 
(-1.04) (-1.02) (-1.40) 
 
(0.38) (0.41) (-1.38) 
Remaining a wage earner (private) (f) 
 
-0.642* -0.669* -1.150*** 
 
-0.196 -0.249 -1.134*** 
 
-0.037 -0.043 -1.153*** 
 
-0.026 -0.031 -1.153*** 
  
(-1.77) (-1.83) (-3.88) 
 
(-0.77) (-0.97) (-3.81) 
 
(-0.63) (-0.71) (-3.88) 
 
(-0.47) (-0.56) (-3.88) 
Constant 
 
0.131 0.172 -1.630*** 
 
0.061 0.141 -1.626*** 
 
-0.020 -0.012 -1.636*** 
 
0.011 0.019 -1.632*** 
    (0.49) (0.63) (-10.49)   (0.27) (0.61) (-10.45)   (-0.41) (-0.24) (-10.51)   (0.23) (0.40) (-10.49) 
Notes:  
- FD estimate is obtained by means of an OLS regression of the change in the outcome on the treatment dummy and change in X's. 
- IV-FD estimate is obtained by means of a ML regression of the change in the outcome on the treatment dummy (endogenous variable) and change in X's. 
- Robust t-statistics are in brackets and adjusted for clustering at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
- Outcomes: A - Number of treatment; B - Number of times the health insurance card is used to pay for treatment. 
- (d): never at school; (e): never be a wage-earner in the public sector; (f): never be a wage-earner in the private sector are set as the base group, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 4: Determinants of health insurance dynamics (remaining variables) 
  
Uninsured in 2006(a) 
 
Insured under CHI 
insured in 2006(b) 
 
Insured under VHI in 
2006(c)  
Variables  
to CHI 
2008 
to VHI 
2008 
 
to 
uninsured 
2008 
to VHI 
2008 
 
to 
uninsured 
2008 
to CHI 
2008 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Male 
 
1.00 0.85 
 
1.01 0.83 
 
0.88 1.26 
  
(-0.02) (-1.63) 
 
(0.10) (-0.87) 
 
(-1.40) (1.44) 
Age 
 
0.88 0.98 
 
1.04 0.88 
 
1.77** 0.97 
  
(-0.68) (-0.08) 
 
(0.20) (-0.34) 
 
(2.23) (-0.11) 
Age squared 
 
1.05*** 1.02 
 
0.98 1.02 
 
0.92*** 1.03 
  
(2.58) (0.88) 
 
(-1.05) (0.68) 
 
(-3.11) (0.90) 
Kinh 
 
0.46*** 2.24* 
 
3.27*** 3.29** 
 
0.40*** 0.15*** 
  
(-2.71) (1.86) 
 
(4.07) (2.13) 
 
(-3.10) (-4.04) 
Married 
 
0.77 1.50* 
 
1.38 1.28 
 
0.78 0.90 
  
(-1.52) (1.76) 
 
(1.40) (0.85) 
 
(-0.71) (-0.18) 
Smoke 
 
0.84 0.80 
 
1.03 0.99 
 
1.01 0.71 
  
(-1.34) (-1.45) 
 
(0.19) (-0.06) 
 
(0.04) (-1.20) 
Primary education 
 
1.03 1.07 
 
1.04 2.02*** 
 
1.11 1.15 
  
(0.25) (0.80) 
 
(0.35) (3.99) 
 
(0.62) (0.66) 
Lower secondary 
 
0.97 1.18 
 
1.20 1.76** 
 
1.00 1.10 
  
(-0.22) (1.37) 
 
(0.96) (2.28) 
 
(0.01) (0.39) 
Upper secondary 
 
1.26 1.30* 
 
0.94 1.72 
 
1.71** 2.49*** 
  
(1.21) (1.72) 
 
(-0.21) (1.38) 
 
(2.45) (3.02) 
College or higher 
 
7.90*** 2.58*** 
 
0.43** 0.27*** 
 
1.06 6.71** 
  
(5.85) (2.96) 
 
(-2.26) (-2.79) 
 
(0.06) (2.40) 
Has training  
 
1.80** 1.23 
 
0.45*** 0.48* 
 
0.78 1.62 
  
(2.38) (0.66) 
 
(-2.69) (-1.95) 
 
(-0.65) (0.82) 
Household head   
 
1.11 1.04 
 
0.76*** 0.95 
 
0.93 1.89* 
  
(0.88) (0.32) 
 
(-3.30) (-0.22) 
 
(-0.38) (1.77) 
Semi-permanent house  
 
0.71* 1.25 
 
0.99 1.23 
 
1.25 2.65** 
  
(-1.71) (1.07) 
 
(-0.05) (0.73) 
 
(0.97) (2.04) 
Permanent house 
 
0.47*** 1.40 
 
0.92 2.03 
 
1.05 2.22 
  
(-3.45) (1.42) 
 
(-0.28) (1.56) 
 
(0.19) (1.64) 
Household size  
 
0.93* 0.99 
 
1.06 0.97 
 
0.96 0.88* 
  
(-1.69) (-0.28) 
 
(1.03) (-0.54) 
 
(-0.93) (-1.74) 
Income 
 
0.89** 1.04*** 
 
0.96** 1.01 
 
0.95*** 0.89*** 
  
(-2.55) (3.74) 
 
(-2.23) (0.28) 
 
(-4.07) (-3.34) 
Enrolling school(d) 
 
1.50 24.14*** 
 
1.20 6.28*** 
 
0.14*** 0.41 
  
(0.99) (11.38) 
 
(0.39) (3.66) 
 
(-4.58) (-1.20) 
Leaving school(d) 
 
2.16** 3.42*** 
 
1.29 1.92 
 
1.22 1.44 
  
(2.33) (3.55) 
 
(1.19) (1.20) 
 
(0.55) (0.67) 
Remaining at school(d) 
 
3.50*** 33.30*** 
 
0.40*** 10.37*** 
 
0.13*** 0.51 
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Uninsured in 2006(a) 
 
Insured under CHI 
insured in 2006(b) 
 
Insured under VHI in 
2006(c)  
Variables  
to CHI 
2008 
to VHI 
2008 
 
to 
uninsured 
2008 
to VHI 
2008 
 
to 
uninsured 
2008 
to CHI 
2008 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
  
(4.49) (13.73) 
 
(-3.15) (5.52) 
 
(-4.79) (-1.39) 
Becoming a wage earner (public) (e) 
 
12.80*** 1.20 
 
0.48 0.16 
 
0.73 47.80*** 
  
(9.30) (0.34) 
 
(-1.38) (-1.53) 
 
(-0.37) (7.20) 
Becoming a non-wage earner (public) (e) 
 
3.62*** 1.41 
 
0.86 0.61 
 
0.71 1.12 
  
(3.26) (0.69) 
 
(-0.52) (-0.66) 
 
(-0.57) (0.10) 
Remaining a wage earner (public) (e) 
 
18.10*** 3.50** 
 
0.17*** 0.32** 
 
0.51 10.14*** 
  
(7.52) (2.25) 
 
(-5.70) (-2.55) 
 
(-0.76) (3.56) 
Becoming a wage earner (private) (f) 
 
4.74*** 1.06 
 
0.79 1.06 
 
1.59 11.74*** 
  
(5.96) (0.16) 
 
(-0.82) (0.07) 
 
(1.49) (7.27) 
Becoming a non-wage earner (private) (f) 
 
1.83** 1.07 
 
3.04*** 3.19*** 
 
0.97 0.51 
  
(2.10) (0.19) 
 
(3.40) (2.60) 
 
(-0.08) (-0.88) 
Remaining a wage earner (private) (f) 
 
11.95*** 1.41 
 
0.73 0.75 
 
1.56 29.33*** 
  
(7.53) (0.81) 
 
(-1.36) (-0.51) 
 
(0.53) (2.81) 
Income increase 
 
0.95** 1.02* 
 
0.97* 1.03 
 
0.96** 0.95* 
  
(-2.55) (1.74) 
 
(-1.64) (1.02) 
 
(-2.23) (-1.79) 
          No of observations 
 
6774 
  
4557 
  
2780 
 Log pseudo-likelihood 
 
-3943 
  
-2245 
  
-1869 
 Pseudo R-Square   0.19     0.16     0.21   
Notes:  
(a) Remaining uninsured is set as the base group 
(b) Remaining insured under CHI is set as the base group 
(c) Remaining insured under CHI is set as the base group 
(d): never at school; (e): never be a wage-earner in the public sector; (f): never be a wage-earner in the private 
sector are set as the base group, respectively. 
- Regression from multinomial logit model; Relative Risk Ratios are reported; Robust t-statistics are in 
brackets and adjusted for clustering at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
- Urban and regional variables are included. 
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Appendix Table 5: Probit model for the probability of remaining insured under VHI 
Variables 
 
CHI as control 
Male 
 
-0.03 
  
(-0.45) 
Age 
 
-0.16 
  
(-1.40) 
Age squared 
 
0.01 
  
(0.54) 
Kinh 
 
1.97*** 
  
(18.73) 
Married 
 
0.31** 
  
(2.18) 
Disable 
 
-0.15 
  
(-1.62) 
Chronic 
 
-0.07 
  
(-0.66) 
Number of days ill 
 
-0.01 
  
(-1.46) 
Ill last year 
 
-0.02 
  
(-0.33) 
Smoke 
 
-0.15 
  
(-1.51) 
Primary education 
 
0.21*** 
  
(2.82) 
Lower secondary 
 
0.28*** 
  
(3.18) 
Upper secondary 
 
0.34*** 
  
(2.95) 
College or higher 
 
-1.21*** 
  
(-4.68) 
Has training  
 
-0.94*** 
  
(-6.17) 
Public sector employee 
 
-1.67*** 
  
(-11.34) 
Private sector employee 
 
-1.63*** 
  
(-8.38) 
At school 
 
1.57*** 
  
(13.23) 
Household head   
 
-0.24*** 
  
(-2.68) 
Semi-permanent house  
 
0.82*** 
  
(9.39) 
Permanent house 
 
1.23*** 
  
(11.26) 
Household size  
 
-0.03 
  
(-1.56) 
Income 
 
0.02*** 
  
(4.24) 
Pseudo R squared 
 
0.61 
Number of observations  5487 
Notes: Robust t-statistics are in brackets and adjusted for clustering at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Urban and regional variables are included. 
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Appendix Table 6: Total health expenditures and claims in 2008 
Treatment type 
 
Total VHI CHI 
Outpatient 
    
Total expenditure (VND1000/treatment) 
 
613 700 565 
Amount claimed (VND1000/treatment) 
 
150 159 146 
Claim/total expenditure (%) 
 
42 34 47 
Out-of-pocket expenditure/total expenditure (%) 
 
58 66 53 
Inpatient 
    
Total expenditure (VND1000/treatment) 
 
2574 3383 2236 
Amount claimed (VND1000/treatment) 
 
922 990 894 
Claim/total expenditure (%) 
 
45 41 46 
Out-of-pocket expenditure/total expenditure (%)   55 59 54 
Notes: Conditional on having any treatment, having health insurance, positive expenditure; Total expenditures 
for outpatient treatment include diagnostic, testing, medicine, micro-surgery, immunization, tips, travelling 
expenses, motorbike and bicycle parking, nutrition food outside the normal meal intake, and buying plastic 
utensils. Total expenditures for inpatient treatment also include treatment fee, hospital bed, and accommodation 
for relatives accompanies taking care of the patients. 
Source: VHLSS 2008. 
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